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Jury Selection in the State of Indiana

Public Law Reform Organization

The Public Law Reform Organization was formed in 1971 by students
and faculty members of Indiana University School of Law to undertake
in-depth studies of statutes, laws, and legal institutions in Indiana which
seem to be in need of reform or change. Financed through small contributions from the Law Student Division of the American Bar Association
and Indiana University Foundation, the organization chose the Indiana
system of jury selection as its topic for investigation by a task force in
1972-73. The task force was aware of some criticisms of the method of
selection of jurors in Indiana courts, raised primarily by attorneys in
motions and appellate briefs. A few court cases in Indiana, the federal
courts, and other states, had also indicated possible constitutional flaws
in a system of juror selection such as Indiana's. With an awareness of
these complaints and possible defects, the organization conducted an
empirical study of juror selection in Indiana in an attempt to find out
how jurors are selected in actual practice, and then began legal research
to determine if, in fact, there are legal or constitutional defects in the
Indiana system. The task force believes this study provides evidence
that reform of Indiana laws concerning selection of juries is needed.
The force has, thus, drafted proposed legislation for remedying the
defects found, relying heavily upon the model legislation proposed by
the commissioners for Uniform State Laws.
The Public Law Reform Organization wishes to express its thanks
to the Law Student Division of the American Bar Association and the
Indiana University Foundation for their financial support for this task
force study, to the Indiana County Clerks who took the time from their
busy schedules to complete our survey questionnaire, and especially to
the County Clerks of Brown, Owen, Greene, and Monroe Counties and
Superior Court Judge of Morgan County for their considerable assistance in permitting use of court records to make our in-depth survey.
Jan Bianchi, Phil Cockerille, Lynn Fishel, Dick Harkness, John Jones, Larry Kane, Jim
Kohlstedt, Tom Krochta, Tim McCauley, Dave Shaw, Marcia Sullivan, Edward Sherman
(faculty supervisor), School of Law, Indiana University.
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PROVISIONS FOR SELECTION OF JURORS IN INDIANA
Selection of jurors in Indiana is governed by legislation passed in
1881. Under the Indiana Constitution, there is a right to trial by jury
in both criminal prosecutions (Art. I ,§13) and civil cases where such
right existed at common law at the time the Indiana Constitution was
adopted in 1851 (Art. I, §20). The state legislature established the
method for selection of jurors in 1881, now found in IC 1971, 33-45-1,
Burns Ind. St. Ann. §4-7101 et seq.
Reliance on Jury Commissioners and Tax Duplicates
The Indiana juror selection statutes provide that the judge of the
Circuit Court of each country shall appoint two persons who must be
freeholders and voters within the county to serve as jury commissioners.
The commissioners must be of opposite political parties. They are required to select names which go into a jury box from which names will
ultimately be selected for calling jury venire panels when needed. The
jury commissioners are required,
"from th names of legal voters and citizens of the United States on
the latest tax duplicates and the tax schedules of the county, examine
for the purpose of determining the sex, age and identity of prospective jurors and proceed to select and deposit, in a box furnished by
the clerk for that purpose, the names writtha on separate slips of
paper of uniform shape, size, and color, of twice as many persons
as will be required by law for grand and petit jurors. . ." (Emphasis
added) IC 1971, §33-4-5-2, §4-7104.
In selecting the names to go into the box, the commissioners are bound
by statutorily prescribed oath and must:
"select none but persons whom you believe to be of good repute for
intelligence and honesty. ." IC 1971, §33-4-5-1, Burns, §4-7 101.
Thus, there are three principal statutory requirements for selection of
names to be put into the box-the individual must be a legal voter and
citizen, his name must be on the latest tax duplicates or tax schedule
of the county, and the jury commissioner must believe him to be of good
repute for intelligence and honesty.

Judicial

Elimination of Tax Duplicate Requirement
The statutory requirement that the names of potential jurors must be
on the county tax duplicates or schedules meant, of course, that they
must owxn property, real or personal, which is taxable in the county.
In a day when Indiana was largely a rural state and most farmers owned
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some land of their own, this requirement may not have excluded a large
number of citizens. However, with the increase of urbanization and
rental housing, substantial numbers of citizens were excluded from
eligibility for jury service. One mitigating factor was that motor
vehicles, house trailers, and boats, were listed as taxable personal property on county tax schedules. Hence, many non-property owners were
made eligible for jury service if they owned a car, trailer, or boat.
In 1970, however, when the state motor vehicle department was given
responsibility for collecting fees for registration and ownership of motor
vehicles, house trailers, and boats, these owners were removed from
county personal property tax schedules. This drastic reduction in the
number of names available for jury service was raised in a criminal case
in Vanderburgh County. The Circuit Court judge, after finding the
statutory method of juror selection did not now comply with the requirements of the Indiana and United States Constitutions, ordered the
jury commissioners to ignore the tax duplicate requirement and instead
select names from the master file of registered voters in the county. The
county prosecutor challenged the judge's order, but the Indiana Supreme Court, ina unanimous decision, upheld his order. The Court
stated use of voter lists' "would include a representative cross-section of
all segments of the citizenry and thereby assure representation of all
classes."
Although the Indiana Supreme Court sanctioned the method of
selection ordered by the Vanderburgh County circuit judge, its decision
only directly affected that county. The statutory requirement that potential jurors be on tax duplicates remains in the Indiana statutes.
To determine the use of the Vanderburgh decision in the State, the
task force sent a questionnaire to all ninety-two county clerks. Replies
indicated all counties now ignore the statutory requirement that potential jurors be on the tax duplicates, using voter registration rolls instead.
However, a number of counties use additional requirements for juror
eligibility, and the survey showed considerable disparity among county
officials as to their understanding of what juror qualifications the state
law now requires. Thus, elimination of the present statutory tax duplicate requirement from the Indiana statutes and passage of a clear statutory rule on juror eligibility seems to be needed.
Discretion in Jury Commissioners to Choose Persons of Good Repute
for Intelligence and Honesty
The Vanderburgh Circuit Court case did not alter the statutory requirement that persons whose names are put in the box "be of good
repute for intelligence and honesty." Since guidelines are provided in
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the statute or elsewhere as to which standards the commissioners are to
apply in making this determination, commissioners are vested with virtually absolute discretion in determining qualified persons. Often referred to as the "key man' or "blue ribbon" method of jury selection,
commissioner discretion was common in many states in the 19th century,
and no doubt served some useful purpose in a day when many citizens
could neither read nor write and communities were often small enough
that jury commissioner could be personally familiar with the repute of
most citizens. Today, however, jury commissioners are rarely in a position to know more than a small percentage of potential jurors. There is
the further question today as to whether this discretionary power is
needed, given modern procedures for screening potential jurors through
questionnaires and for voir dire of venire panels with ample opportunity
for eliminating clearly unqualified jurors in the courtroom.
Since the statutory provision concerning jury commissioners' determination of repute is vague, the task force felt it necessary to determine how,
in fact, this requirement is applied in the various counties. The survey
revealed considerable disparity. Many county clerks indicated jury
commissioners exercised virtually no discretion and simply used a
random method of selection from voter registration roles. Others commented that commissioners compiled with "repute" requirement by
scrutinizing the names that had been selected at random. Still others
indicated that commissioners used their own judgment throughout the
selection process, adding names of persons whom they considered of good
repute while excluding others.
The survey further indicated great disparity as to attributes on which
commissioners base their decision as to repute. Some counties, it seems,
use character traits of a highly subjective nature which are not specified in the statute. For example, in one county, one jury commissioner
exercises considerable personal judgment, adding to the box names of
persons whom he believes would be good jurors and scrutinizing the
names of persons provisionally selected by random selection from the
voter list. The other commissioner, who is frequently absent from Indiana on business, generally has a secretary take names in certain numerical sequence (as every twentieth name) from the voter list.
Number of Names Placed in the Juror Box by Commissioners
The Indiana statute provides that "twice as many persons as will be
required by law for grand and petit jurors" be placed in the juror box
from xwhich the venire panels w\ill ultimately be selected (IC 1971,
§33-4-5-2). The puropse of this requirement would seem to be to limit
the ability of the commissioners to insure the selection of persons for
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venire panels by putting in the box approximately the same number of
names which would ultimately be drawn. In other words, it seems to
have been an attempt to impose a certain degree of randomness of the
commissioners' selection process. However, the task force's survey and
interviews indicated that this provision is not being uniformly followed
in the counties. In some counties, a certain number of names are placed
in the box periodically (for example, 200 every three months), but that
number is rarely twice the number of names actually needed for selection
of venire panels. Sometimes, the number of names put in the box is
just about equal to the number of names needed for venire panels, thus
enabling the commissioners to virtually pick the verinemen. Sometimes,
the number of names put in the box is not sufficient for the venire panels
selected, and the commissioners are asked to add additional names.
In one county, the names in the box were exhausted, the sheriff's deputies were instructed to go out on the street and bring in persons to serve
on juries for cases about to go to trial. The survey also indicated considerable uncertainty among county clerks as to how many names were to
be added each time and how often. It appears in many counties that
there is little concern for estimating how many veniremen would be
required and insuring that twice that number of names were placed in
the box, the procedure instead being that of a set number of names
which had traditionally been used.
Thus, the randomness that might be achieved by the "twice the number" rule is often lost. The rule itself, of course, only contemplates a
limited degree of randomness, and a rule requiring that the number of
names placed in the box be a percentage of the population, rather than
an estimate of the court's potential need for jurors, would be more satisfactory to achieve genuine randomness.
Indiana Constitutional Requirements Respecting Juror Selection
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the method of selection
of jurors must not be arbitrary and that complete imparitality should be
sought.2 There has been no suggestion that the Court consider the use
of jury commissioners from the two major political parties to contravene
that standard. The Court has not spoken comprehensively as to what
qualifications can be used for juror eligibility, although it stated in the
Vanderburgh case that use of voter lists, rather than tax duplicates,
was satisfactory because it "would include a representative crosssection of all segments of the citizenry and thereby assure representation of all classes."
(255 Ind. at 513).
It would appear that the
statutory requirement that prospective jurors must be on the county tax
rolls would be found to be constitutionally defective since it excludes a
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large percentage of the community. The voluntary changeover to voter
lists seems to have removed the need for such a decision.3 The Indiana
Supreme Court has not, however, endorsed a standard requiring a
wholly representative cross-section of the community. In Shack' the
defendant in a murder prosecution challenged his conviction on the
grounds that the jury commissioners' application of their statutor' discretion excluded a particular class of potential jurors, one jury commissioner having admitted attempting to limit jurors to those "somewhat
successful in life." The Court found no constitutional violation since
systematic exclusion of a group was not shown. The Court did rule that
"the more random the selection process, the less will be the appearance
of arbitrariness." Thus, the Court seems to have adopted a test that
discrepancies in the representation of various groups is not enough,
absent actual systematic exclusion of a group.
It would seem difficult to prove that the limitation of potential
jurors to voter registration lists results in such systematic exclusion of
groups, although the task force findings indicate that certain groups,
namely females, lower economic classes, young, and possibly minority
groups, tend to be underrepresented by the present juror selection
methods. This result is probably not entirely due to the use of voter
lists, but rather arises from the manner in which the juror selection
system works-the subjective application of discretion by the commissioners, the failure to attempt to trace persons whose jury notice has
been returned because they have moved, the liberal granting of excuses from jury duty, and the financial requests and personal hardship
of jury duty on certain classes and groups which encourages failure to
respond and requests to be excused. It is clear that there are better
sources than voter lists for achieving a random selection of the community and preventing under-representation of groups; in fact, no one
source is generally adequate, and a combination of sources-such as
voter lists, telephone directory, and motor vehicle registration-is most
likely to achieve the best cross section of the community. However, the
test thus far applied by the Indiana Supreme Court seems to fall short
of requiring an attempt at achieving a representative cross-section. It
appears likely, therefore, that reliance only upon voter lists in the present statutory judicial scheme for juror selection in Indiana is constitutional, although the entire juror selection system might well prove constitutionally defective because of systematic exclusion.
Perhaps more questionable under state constitutional standards is the
statutory provision for jury commissioners to determine "good repute."
The absence of any guidelines and therefore the potential for use of
highly subjective standards raises constitutional questions. The task
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force findings that county clerks and jury commissioners differ widely
in their understanding of the commissioner's use of discretion raises
further constitutional doubts. However, "key man" provisions have
generally survived constitutional attack in federal and other state
courts. The Indiana Supreme Court in Shack held that limited use of
this discretion as provided for by statute is constitutional. The Court,
disappointingly, did not provide much enlightenment as to the type of
situation in which limited use of discretion might be exceeded.
Judge DeBruler, ina concurring opinion, warned that any subjective
test for prospective jurors is "bounded only by the whim or caprice of
the one applying the test and is contrary to the goal of eliminating individual discretion and potential discrimination, from the selection
process." (288 N.E. 2d at 165.)
It will, of course, be extremely difficult to prove that jury commissioners have used only limited discretion and have not abused limited
discretion. The task force found some reluctance on the part of officials to discuss frankly the selection process and defensiveness as to what
actually occurs; many county clerks simply restated the statutory requirements in describing how jurors were selected. Some admitted in
further questioning that in fact, such standards are not followed (as,
for example, the tax duplicates list requirement). It seems unlikely
that a jury commissioner will admit systematic exclusion of any group,
or bias for or against certain types of persons. Thus, commissioner's use
of discretion, not regulated by any standards, seems to be, as in many
other situations, involving vague administrative standards, a virtually
unreviewable action.
Little criticism has been devoted by counsel in cases of juror selection
procedures in Indiana except for juror qualifications and commissioner
discretion. However, the task force findings indicate at least in certain
counties, the overall administration of the juror selection process might
be constitutionally defective. It seems possible a series of administrative procedures and actions can combine to result in serious underrepresentation on juries of certain groups in the community. For example, the task force found that in many counties, the voter registration lists used are a year old or older. Sometimes, this seems to be done
for administrative convenience so that the juror selection officials would
not use the same lists or files being used by voter registration personnel.
However, the result is that a sizable percentage of the persons on outdated voter lists have changed addresses and newly registered voters are
not picked up. Thus a voter registration drive which may register substantial numbers of groups who are not normally registered in large numbers (such as union members, old age pensioners, or students) will not
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result in their consideration for jury duty until after those lists are retired b the voter registration office. In addition, persons ma' be purged
from the voter registration lists for not having voted for a certain number of elections. They are thus rendered ineligible for jury duty.
Procedures used for notification of potential jurors can also result in
greater exclusion for some groups than others. Persons who move frequently (lower income groups and young people are more likely to fall
in this category) may not be at the address shown on the voter registration. The task force found that a high percentage, sometimes as high as
50%, of juror notices are returned to county clerks because the individual does not reside at the given address. Use of outdated voter lists increases the likelihood that the address will be wrong. It was found that
most clerk's offices do not attempt to locate individuals when a juror
notice is returned.
The administration of excusals from jury service can also result in
underrepresentation of certain groups. Excuses are sometimes routinely
granted upon request by judges, and in some counties, by a bailiff or
clerk. In many counties, judges require proof of hardship, though employment, school classes, and other inconveniences suffice. The low pay
given jurors and the requirement that a jury panel sit for a lengthy
period (perhaps three months) make jury service for certain individuals,
(such as self-employed, employees of employers who do not compensate
them for lower jury service pay, full-time students, and mothers with
children) extremely difficult. Also, such persons as retired individuals,
federal or state employees (who continue to draw their salary while serving on jury duty) and housewives may be overrepresented. Obviously,
particularized evidence would be required in individual cases to prove
that the combination of administrative actions has resulted in systematic
exclusion of a group.
U.S. Constitutional Requirements Respecting Juror Selection
The 7th Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases only applies
to trials in federal courts," but the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury
in criminal cases is applicable to state trials through incorporation of the
6th Amendment into 14th Amendment due process,6 except for certain
features not considered basic to that right, such as the unanimous verdict,7 and the txwelye-person jury) However, the Supreme Court has
held that the principle of federalism requires that the federal government refrain from imposing its own qualifications for jury service upon
the states.9 Thus, federal courts have not found unconstitutional per se
state juror selection procedures like the "key man" system (officials
nominating "reputable" individuals to recommend prospective jurors
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or themselves have the power to select those persons they believe to be
qualified for jury duty) and the "blue ribbon jury" system (officials,
sometimes after drawing the name of a prospective juror, apply certain
tests to determine eligibility, including tests as to character and intelligence.)
These systems were rejected, however, by Congress in passing the
Federal Jury Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., which calls for
random selection from sources such as voter lists, telephone directories,
city directories, or a combination of them, to achieve the objective of a
representative cross section of the community, and their constitutionality
as applied continues to be questioned. (See "The Key Man System of
State Jury selection as a Source of Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," 77 Dickinson L. Rev. 117 (1973).
In Carter," supra, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that an Alabama juror selection statute that permitted commissioners to select persons "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent
and . . . esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character

and sound judgment" was invalid on its face. It also found that the
practice of appointing all white commissioners by the governor was not
necessarily proof of racial discrimination. Thus, the Court left open an
attack upon a jury selection scheme where there is evidence of racial
discrimination in its application.
The possibility was opened later." The Court ruled that although
the statistical data were insufficient to make a prima facie case of invidious discrimination in juror selection, the fact that the cards for
potential jurors indicated their race "provided a clear and easy opportunity for racial discrimination" by the officials. It held that although
there was "no evidence that the commissioners consciously selected by
race", the statistics made it sufficiently likely that they did so, at least
unconsciously, and therefore the burden to prove nondiscrimination was
shifted to the state. It found that the state did not adequately explain
the elimination of blacks during the selection process and therefore held
it unconstitutional. Thus, a procedure permitting officials to apply nonracial standards (such as honesty and intelligence) may not be unconstitutional on its face, if it can be unconstitutional as applied.
The Supreme Court 2 declined to decide whether the same standards
would apply to cases involving sex discrimination, although Justice
Douglas, in a concurrence, stated that it does. Commentators have generally agreed that discrimination based on economic status would also be
ground for a finding of unconstitutionality." The findings of the task
force which suggest that certain groups especially women, lower economic groups, transients, students, and possible minority groups-are
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underrepresented in venire panels in some Indiana counties seem to raise
issues of a constitutional dimension. The Indiana statute, by permitting
jury commissioners to determine whether jurors are of "good repute for
intelligence and honesty", without any additional guidelines or safeguards against arbitrariness, certainly does provide an opportunitx for
discrimination against such groups. Under the Alexander standard,
there would be grounds for shifting to the state the burden of proving
that the juror selection system is not discriminatory in a case where
statistical evidence shows that certain groups are underrepresented.
The Alexander case seems to be a warning from the court that although a state may have a juror selection sxstem that uses valid, nondiscriminatory tests or standards for juror eligibility, many of such tests
are unduly vague and, therefore, potential vehicles for discrimination by
administering officials. Tests concerning age, literacy, residence in
county, and lack of physical and mental handicaps provide an objective
standard which can be applied and reviewed, but subjective character
traits, like "good repute for intelligence and honesty'," do not. As stated
in the Report ofthe Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of
the Judicial Conference of the CU7nited States," such standards "are almost impossible to administer properly and uniformly. The requirements for services can too easily mean one thing to one clerk and another
to a second." For this reason, as stated in the Report, at 363, the use
of such requirements was rejected in the Federal Jury Selection Act:
"The committee is in accord with those who emphasize the importance of obtaining competent jurors, but it believes that 'the desire for
competency must not be pursued to the extent that a fair cross-section
is prevented.' Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F. 2d 34, 55 (5th Cir.
1966). The committee disagrees with those who suggest that the
elimination of the key man system or subjective methods for determining "intelligence" or "common sense" will result in packing Federal
juries with misfits and incompetents. Jurors still will be screened by
the use of voting lists, by the statutory qualifications, by the court's
power to exclude unqualified jurors under specific circumstances,
and by the use of preemptory and cause challenges (which are left undisturbed by the bill). We believe that jurors so selected x'ill possess
sufficient intelligence to understand the trial and adequate judgment
to render a proper verdict."
Recent Supreme Court developments indicate continued desirability
of achieving a representative cross-section of the community in state
juries. The decision in Miller1 permitting juries to apply "community"
standards in the application of obsecenity laws, makes it especially im80

portant that juror selection procedures insure fair cross-section representation on juries. It appears that although a "key man", "blue ribbon"
system of juror selection such as Indiana's is probably constitutional on
its face, the system is suspect in providing greater likelihood of discrimination. As applied in any particular county, it might be found unconstitutional because of actual exclusion of or serious under-representation
of certain groups. The task force does not believe the findings provide
sufficient evidence to make such a case, but that the administration of
the selection system in a number of counties indicates arbitrariness and
underrepresentation of certain groups which might be proven with sufficient investigation and adequate discovery devices.
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